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Abstract 
Our research assessed whether mood and emotion can be measured as distinct 
constructs. Development and validation of the Emotion and Mood Components of 
Anxiety Questionnaire (EMCA-Q) is reported. We based the questionnaire on a 
subjective-contextual model of emotion-mood distinctions, which specifies that 
differentiation of the emotion of anxiety from an anxious mood should reflect an 
individual‟s awareness of the context in which the respective feeling states occur. In 
study 1, we describe the development of the 10-item, two factor EMCA-Q. In study 2, 
we use confirmatory factor analysis to provide support for the factorial validity of the 
scale. In study 3, we provide preliminary evidence of construct validity by 
demonstrating that students preparing to submit their thesis reported significantly 
higher scores of anxious emotion about their thesis than anxious mood. Findings 
suggested that emotion and mood might be distinguished empirically in line with 
theoretical predictions when subjective-contextual information used to distinguish 
between the two states was assessed. 
 
Key words: confirmatory factor analysis; measurement; psychometric; validity; affect; 
stress; emotion; mood. 
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1. Introduction 
The conceptualisation of emotion and mood as distinct phenomena has 
received much attention in the psychology and philosophy literatures. Historically, 
differentiation of emotion from mood has been problematic both conceptually and, in 
particular, in terms of measurement. In everyday speech, feeling states such as anxiety 
can be described as either an emotion or a mood; we can experience the emotion of 
anxiety or be in an anxious mood. This semantic problem reflects the close similarity 
of the two constructs given that, from the perspective of the person experiencing 
them, the emotion of anxiety and an anxious mood may feel identical (Watson, 2000).  
Previous approaches to distinguishing emotion from mood in the academic 
literature have focused on structural distinctions, such as contrasting the brief 
intensity of an emotion with the more enduring and diffuse nature of a mood (Watson 
& Clark, 1997). Despite their intuitive appeal, none of the proposed emotion-mood 
distinctions are supported by published data, nor is there an accepted methodology for 
use in investigating the issue. Several measures of either emotion or mood have been 
published (see Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990; Power, 2006; Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988), although none of them distinguish between the two constructs. 
This is perhaps because the development of a differential scale requires a theoretical 
framework that clearly operationalizes emotion-mood distinctions beyond simple 
structural criteria. 
The complexity of distinguishing emotion from mood should not be under-
estimated, especially given the volume of research interest in the topic. Beedie, Terry, 
and Lane (2005) addressed this issue by firstly conducting a content analysis of 65 
published works that offered distinctions between emotion and mood. They also used 
qualitative methods to investigate emotion-mood distinctions among a sample of 106 
non-academic participants, arguing for the utility of folk theory (see Colman, 2001) in 
conceptual development. The authors reported a high level of agreement between 
academic and non-academic opinions in both the nature and direction of potential 
distinguishing criteria. They identified eight distinguishing themes, with duration, 
intentionality, cause, consequences, and function cited most frequently, and intensity, 
physiology, and awareness of cause cited less frequently. In summarising, the authors 
proposed that emotion and mood can be distinguished empirically if the subjective 
context of the affective responses (i.e., the individual‟s awareness of the antecedents, 
focus, and likely consequences) is also assessed in line with theoretical distinctions. 
Subsequently, Beedie (2007) proposed that the subjective context in which an 
individual experiences feelings such as anxiety or anger determines whether they 
should be  interpreted as emotions or moods. This proposal extended the work of 
Clore (1994) who explained how emotion and mood could feel similar but be 
perceived as different constructs. Subjective context also influence the availability of 
strategies to regulate such feelings. For example, if a person feels angry following an 
argument with a partner, there is an opportunity to re-appraise the context surrounding 
the argument and potentially attenuate the anger. By contrast, if a person feels angry 
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but cannot identify a cause of those feelings, its focus will be unconstrained. If the 
person can identify the cause of feelings, then he or she could attempt to re-appraise 
its meaning, whereas if the perceive cause is not known, suppression of feelings is the 
likely regulation strategy (Gross & John, 2003). 
When the criteria identified by Beedie et al. (2005) are applied to existing 
measures, it is apparent why no published data are available to demonstrate emotion 
and mood distinctions. Most scales use single adjective items that assess affective 
responses without providing contextual information (Power, 2006). Although it is 
tempting to infer emotion-mood distinctions from structural information relating to 
duration or intensity of feelings, which is included in some scales, this is not reliable. 
Using anxiety as an example, irrespective of whether the response timeframe suggests 
short duration (how do you feel right now) or enduring feelings (how have you felt 
this week), no information as to whether the anxiety is an emotion or a mood is 
available. A right now format does not distinguish between a current mood and a 
current emotion, and a this week format does not clarify whether the respondent has 
been in the same anxious mood or emotionally anxious about the same thing during 
that period. Likewise the intensity of responses is unhelpful. Although it is tempting 
to assume that low intensity anxiety is a mood and high intensity anxiety an emotion, 
the respondent could be mildly emotionally anxious or in an intensely anxious mood. 
Figure 1 graphically represents the criteria identified by Beedie et al. (2005) 
for distinguishing emotion from mood. A proposed 5-stage process commences with 
recognition of an affective response that may or may not register in consciousness. In 
stage 3, the appraisal stage, the person seeks to determine the cause of feelings and in 
stage 4 decides whether action is to be taken. Stage 5 is a behavioral response, which 
also serves as a feedback loop to the initial affective response. The present study 
applied the model to the development of a questionnaire to distinguish an anxious 
mood from the emotion of anxiety. To validate our measure, we report the findings of 
three studies. In study 1, we report the development of the content validity of items. In 
study 2, we test the hypothesized factor structure using confirmatory factor analysis in 
academic and competitive settings. In stage 3, we test changes in mood and emotions 
over time in relation to a personally meaningful stressor. 
___________ 
Figure 1 here 
___________ 
Although any one of several discrete feeling states could have been chosen as 
the „vehicle‟ state for distinguishing emotion from mood, anxiety was selected 
because it is a common affective response among several populations of interest. 
Anxiety also has theoretical emotion and mood components. For example, 
performance anxiety is an emotion as generally conceived (i.e., both caused by, and 
about, something), whereas „free-floating‟ anxiety is a prototypical mood (i.e., diffuse 
and not about any particular thing) (Zajonc, 1984; Watson, 2000). 
2. Study 1: Development of the EMCA-Q 
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Using the model in Figure 1, an emotion is defined as a feeling caused by a 
specific object and focused on that object (i.e., it is about the object). Emotions have 
behavioral consequences. Mood is defined as a set of feelings that are neither caused 
by nor focused on a specific object. Moods have cognitive consequences. The 
definitions are independent of structural criteria such as intensity and duration. 
2.1 Item development 
To facilitate the development of anxiety-related items appropriate to the target 
population we recruited 20 student-athletes (Age: M = 21.4, SD = 4.5 yr,, Male n =11, 
Female, n = 9), all of whom had competed in sport to regional level and passed 
academic qualifications to enable entry onto a degree program. Participants were 
asked to suggest adjectives that best describe feelings they experience in stressful 
situations, such as sports competitions, academic examinations or before important 
deadlines. The most frequently cited feelings included “anxious”, “unconfident”, 
“edgy”, and “tense”.  
We extended this adjective list by incorporating words from several lexical 
taxonomies found in the general psychology literature (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 
1987; Power, 2006; Russell, 1989) and sport psychology literature (Jones, Lane, Bray, 
Uphill, & Catlin, 2005; Terry, Lane, & Fogarty, 2003). Ambiguous items, including 
descriptors of physical states (e.g., “tense”), cognitive states (e.g., “concerned”) and 
descriptive states (e.g., “vulnerable”) were removed, as recommended by Ortony et al. 
(1987). “Concerned”, for example, might relate to feeling anxious but it could also be 
interpreted as meaning “interested”.  
The resultant stimulus list included 37 anxiety-related adjectives. 
Subsequently, we asked 96 student-athletes (M = 19.78 yr., SD = 1.37 yr., Male n = 
56; Female n = 40) to identify those items they most associated with emotional 
responses in sport and academic situations. The five most frequently experienced 
feelings were “anxious”, “nervous”, “apprehensive”, “worried”, and “self-doubting”. 
These descriptors were incorporated into two 5-item scales of statements 
describing emotion and mood, in line with the model shown in Table 1. Emotional-
anxiety items reflected a focus on particular events and goals, whereas anxious-mood 
items were phrased to reflect feelings that were neither caused by nor focused on a 
particular event. Participants were asked to rate how they were feeling right now. 
Items were scored on a 4-point likert scale ranging from 0 = “not at all” to 4 “very 
much so". 
__________ 
Table 1 here 
__________ 
The 10 items, along with their respective context (see Tables 2 and 3), were 
subsequently tested for factorial validity using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
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Consistent with theoretical predictions, we hypothesized that the emotion and mood 
items would form independent factors across two different samples. 
 
Study 2: Test of factorial validity 
2.1 Method 
We tested the factorial validity of the EMCA-Q by administering the measure 
to two independent samples. The scale was worded to be specific for sports 
performance (sample 1) and academic assessment (sample 2) situations.  
Participants in sample 1 were 190 student athletes (M = 21.9 yr., SD = 3.8 yr., 
(Male n =109, Female, n = 89),) studying for undergraduate degrees in sport and 
exercise science at a university in London. Participants were instructed to recall an 
event in which they had competed in the past three months. To facilitate an accurate 
recollection of pre-competition anxiety, participants were encouraged to recount the 
precise details of the period of time leading up to the event in question. Ekman and 
Davidson (1994) suggested that people tend to remember emotionally-charged events 
well, and retrospective measures of anxiety have been shown to be reliable up to three 
months after competition (Hanin & Syrja, 1996). Participants completed the EMCA-Q 
after recalling how they felt immediately prior to the competition. 
Participants in sample 2 were 300 undergraduate and graduate students at a 
London university (M = 24.7 yr., SD = 2.4, Male n = 141, Female n = 159). Students 
completed an exam-specific version of the EMCA-Q approximately 20 minutes 
before commencing the final examinations of their degree. After gaining ethical 
clearance from the  institute of the first author, written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants.  
We assessed model fit with the comparative fit index (CFI) and the 
standardized root mean-squared residual (SRMR) using fit benchmarks suggested by 
Hu and Bentler (1999). Three theoretically-driven models were tested; a correlated 
two-factor model of five items each, an uncorrelated two-factor model of five items 
each, and a single-factor model of anxiety that included all 10 items which, if 
supported, would suggest that the measure could not distinguish between the two 
constructs. We hypothesized that the two-factor correlated model would show the best 
fit as it specified a degree of conceptual independence, whilst recognizing that mood 
and emotion are often experienced simultaneously (Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner, & 
Reynolds, 1996). It is acknowledged that we could have tested alternative models 
such as those that could be generated from exploratory factor analysis, we restricted 
our analysis to the primary theoretical issues. 
3.2 Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses indicated that data were not normally distributed in either 
sample (Sample 1, Mardia = 5.08; Sample 2, Mardia = 16.10), hence the robust 
estimation method (RCFI) was used. As shown in Table 3, CFA results provided 
support for the correlated model in both samples, although fit indices were marginal. 
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Support for the correlated model indicated that emotion and mood states tend to co-
occur (emotion-mood: r = .72, P < .01) as suggested by Beedie et al. (2005). Both 
alpha coefficients were acceptable (emotion = .82, mood = .71), suggesting two 
internally reliable factors. Given the transient nature of mood and emotion, alpha 
coefficients are preferred to test-rest design. Results were consistent with the notion 
that an individual in an anxious mood is more likely to experience the emotion of 
anxiety in specific situations, while the factors that elicited that emotion, or the 
emotion itself, may simultaneously contribute to the development of an anxious 
mood. It has been argued that the affective residue from one situation influences the 
appraisal process of a subsequent one, in which case the individual cannot attribute 
the cause of feelings to one event or object (Lane & Terry, 2000; Parkinson et al., 
1996). It should be noted that the uncorrelated model showed poor fit indices. This 
suggests that anxious feelings have a common core regardless of whether they are 
perceived to be linked to a specific context (emotion) or not (mood). From a folk 
psychology perspective, this supports the premise that despite the acknowledged 
distinction between an emotion and a mood in the English language, there is sufficient 
commonality between these two constructs for them both to be labelled anxiety in 
some instances.    
Collectively, model testing provided provisional evidence of factorial validity 
and internal reliabililty. Given the marginal difference in fit indices between the 
single-factor and correlated models, however, the relative independence of emotion 
and mood factors remained uncertain. We therefore examined how the mood and 
emotion scales would be influenced by a meaningful stressor. If mood and emotion 
represent different constructs, then they should behave differently.  
______________ 
 
Table 2 about here 
_______________ 
 
3. Study 3: Test of differences in emotion and mood responses over time 
3.1 Method 
Theoretical predictions suggest that emotional responses are triggered by 
exposure to a specific event. This study focused on changes in emotion and mood 
responses among students preparing for the submission of a final year thesis. Previous 
research has identified that students perceive such a situation as stressful (Collins & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2003; Devonport & Lane, 2006). We hypothesized that the intensity of 
emotion would increase significantly over time (as the submission date loomed) 
whereas the intensity of mood would not. 
Fifty-one undergraduate students who were completing their final year thesis 
(male = 29; female = 31; age range: 20-32 yr.) completed the EMCA-Q at 6 weeks, 4 
weeks, and 2 weeks before thesis submission. The EMCA-Q was reworded for thesis 
completion. 
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4.2 Results and discussion 
Mean emotion and mood responses at three time points leading up to thesis 
submission are shown in Figure 2. A repeated-measures MANOVA identified a 
significant main effect for changes in emotion and mood responses over time (Wilks 
lambda 4,47 = .12, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .88). Univariate analyses showed, as 
hypothesized, that the intensity of emotion increased over time (F 2,100 = 95.12, p < 
.001, partial eta
2
 = .66) whereas no significant changes in mood responses occurred (F 
2,100 = 1.92, p = .15, partial eta
2
 = .04). Consistent with theoretical predictions, 
emotion scores increased at each time point. Paired t-tests identified significant 
differences between emotion and mood scores at each time point (6 weeks, t = 4.29, p 
< .001; 4 weeks, t = 6.96, p < .001; and 2 weeks, t = 11.67, p < .001).  
_____________ 
Figure 2 here 
_____________ 
Findings demonstrated that emotions and mood responses, as assessed by the 
EMCA-Q, varied as hypothesized. Emotional states increased in relation to the 
impending thesis hand-in date whereas mood states did not. Emotion scores were 
significantly higher than mood scores at each time point. We suggest that the 
predominance of emotions indicates that students were cognisant of the perceived 
causes of these feelings, which is unsurprising given the explicit demands of thesis 
completion.  
In summary, responses to the EMCA-Q demonstrated meaningful differences 
in emotion and mood responses in the weeks leading up to thesis hand-in. Given that 
participants‟ responses were consistent with the underlying theory, these findings 
provide initial evidence of construct validity and demonstrate the potential utility of 
the EMCA-Q for applied practitioners. Where intense emotions are evidenced, the 
cause of feelings is known. In such circumstances, practitioners could counsel 
individuals to direct their coping efforts towards managing the situation in addition to 
self-regulation. Where the cause of feelings remains unknown, mood enhancement 
strategies centered on self-regulation can be advocated and supported (Gross & John, 
2003). 
4. General discussion 
It is evident from even a cursory review of the scientific literature that most 
psychologists believe there is a difference between an emotion and a mood (e.g., 
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Ruys & Stapel, 2008). Empirical 
evidence that laypeople similarly differentiate emotions from moods is also available 
in the literature (Beedie et al., 2005). However, such differences are problematic to 
implement in practice due to the substantial phenomenological and linguistic overlap 
between the two constructs. Thus, the issue of establishing whether an episode of 
anxiety, anger or depression is an emotion or a mood is rarely addressed explicitly in 
psychological research.  
Researchers often define a feeling state as an “emotion” or a “mood” but 
rarely describe their rationale for doing so. The present results showed that the 
EMCA-Q 
9 
 
constructs of emotion and mood can be distinguished empirically via self-report. This 
distinction was achieved by first conceptualizing emotion and mood as subjective 
context-dependent states. Given the varying conceptualizations of emotion and mood 
in the literature, however, we acknowledge that our distinction will not be universally 
accepted.  
Our test construction process began with an empirical investigation of the 
factors that might distinguish emotion from mood (Beedie et al., 2005), followed by a 
philosophical enquiry into the nature of these factors (Beedie, 2007). Next, we 
utilized rigorous test development procedures to ensure content validity of the 
EMCA-Q, after which we used confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate factorial 
validity in two independent samples. Finally, we demonstrated that EMCA-Q show 
adequate test-retest reliability in situations when emotion and mood factors behave 
differently in relation to a stressor. Taken collectively, we have provided initial 
evidence of construct validity, whilst acknowledging that scale validation is an 
ongoing process (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1998) and tests of criterion validity have 
yet to be conducted. 
We propose two significant implications of our findings. First, we have 
demonstrated that when assessing anxiety, it is important to be aware that it can be 
intentional (i.e., one can be anxious about something), or non-intentional (i.e., one can 
anxious about nothing in particular and seemingly for no particular reason). Logically, 
the fact that intentional and non-intentional anxiety can be distinguished by the person 
experiencing them suggests that intentional and non-intentional anxiety are indeed 
two different constructs; what are commonly termed emotion and mood. Hence, 
questionnaires with single-word descriptors cannot reliably distinguish emotion from 
mood. Although emotion-mood distinctions may not be important in some settings, a 
self-report measure that fails to indicate the degree to which anxiety is intentional or 
non-intentional may not allow a researcher to make a valid measurement nor a 
practitioner to make a practically useful diagnosis.  
The second, and perhaps more significant, implication of our findings is that 
our empirical differentiation of emotion from mood should encourage researchers and 
practitioners working within the affective domain to use the terms with greater 
precision, in keeping with the scientific ethos that underlies the study of human 
behavior. For example, when a technique is described as a mood induction, it should 
describe the induction of a non-intentional and diffuse state. If the subject is both 
aware of the cause and the object of the induced state, it is almost certainly an 
emotion induction rather than a mood induction and should be referred to accordingly. 
Similarly, when discussing pre-competition emotions, authors should ensure they are 
describing intentional states related to the upcoming competition, not feelings that 
may relate to ongoing existential issues unrelated to the competition. Only by using 
terms with precision will many of the inconsistencies in emotion and mood research 
be clarified. In fact, it is hoped that the findings of the present study will encourage 
the re-appraisal of several consistently contradictory areas of research, such as mood 
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and memory and mood and sports performance, where the moods in question may be 
contaminated by, or in fact be, emotions. 
It is important to balance the contribution of our findings by acknowledging 
some limitations of the three studies presented. Firstly, self-reports of anxiety assume 
that people have the capability and desire to describe accurately how they are feeling. 
Although this assumption may not always hold true, with current technologies, self-
report provides the only access to the subjective processes under investigation. We 
acknowledge, however, that greater efforts could have been made to control for 
response bias, particularly in study 3. Secondly, sample sizes for the confirmatory 
factor analysis studies were relatively small, limiting the generalizability of the 
findings back to the population from which they were drawn. Thirdly, we focused 
exclusively on anxiety and, although this is a useful starting point, it is too early to 
suggest that emotion and mood distinctions could be identified for other constructs. 
Fourthly, the validation process would have benefitted from a test-retest design in 
which no changes in anxiety were expected. Fifthly, a concurrent validity study would 
elucidate how anxious mood and emotion relate to constructs whose validity has been 
already established. We suggest that attempting to address the limitations should be a 
priority for future investigations. 
In conclusion, one particular distinguishing criterion, subjective context, was 
chosen by which to differentiate emotion from mood. Although results provide 
provisional support for the validity of the EMCA-Q, we acknowledge that future 
research is needed. Such research might continue to validate the EMCA-Q or 
approach the question of how to distinguish mood from emotion from a different 
starting point. The choice of the subjective context was the result of a logical 
reasoning process (see Beedie, 2007) but other equally valid approaches may be 
possible. We hope that future research addressing emotion-mood distinctions may 
open the door to alternative models. In such cases, the EMCA-Q or a similar 
questionnaire might serve in the role of a manipulation check or a means of cross-
validation for researchers seeking to distinguish emotion from mood via, for example, 
neurological or biochemical indices. 
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